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Agency 
Isis, 107, number 4 (2016) 
Response to Frans van Lunteren, “Reviving the Grand Narrative” 
 
M. Norton Wise, University of California, Los Angeles 
 
Abstract: In support of Frans van Lunteren’s project for big-picture history organized around 
“Mediating Machines,” these comments stress “mediation” as active agency in the world rather 
than as mere metaphor, on the view that this active agency underlies the potency of technologies 
as mediators, both between different domains of knowledge and between theories and things. 
Similarly important for this power is the diversity of the particular constructions that constitute 
mediators like “balances” or “engines.” Diversity of meaning and action gives them their cultural 
reach, from mechanical contrivance to natural process to political ideology. An interesting 
question remains about how many mediating machines will suffice for the big picture of 
modernity over four centuries. Statistics, for example, might be a crucial addition. Another 
question concerns how to characterize the knowledge regime of a mediating machine. Van 
Lunteren chooses “information” for the computer. He might also have chosen “complexity,” with 
different import for the character of postmodernity. 
 
There is no knowledge without a technology of knowledge—or, in less grand terms, we require 
tools to think with. That belief appears to underlie Frans van Lunteren’s big-picture view of the 
history of science, as it does my own. Even more concretely, we share the view that the history 
of modern Western science reveals only a few modes of investigating and knowing the world 
that have acquired widespread potency across many subject areas. It is this aspect that makes 
them suitable for a big-picture periodization. Van Lunteren at one point calls these technologies 
of knowledge “dominant knowledge regimes,” which seems admirably to capture their role. And 
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in specifying their function I am very pleased to see that he has developed the notion of 
“mediating machines.” My comments derive from reflections on this idea over the years, most 
recently in a summary article on “How the World Works.”1 
“Mediating machines” gain their historiographic potency from the active role that 
technologies have played in interrelating different aspects of the world. It is useful to distinguish 
two senses of this mediation. One sense—“horizontal,” perhaps—consists in interrelating 
different areas of knowledge on the same plane. That is the sense I took up in “Mediating 
Machines,” concerning the way in which the steam engine mediated between political economy 
and natural philosophy in industrializing Britain. An additional “vertical” sense, developed in 
“Mediations: Enlightenment Balancing Acts, or the Technologies of Rationalism,” concerns the 
way in which technologies interrelate theories and things, interrelate theories about the world 
with the things whose existence they require.2 Thus the calorimeter “weighed,” and thereby 
reified, the fluid that the caloric theory required. The two quite different forms of mediation, 
typically acting together, empower the knowledge regimes of Van Lunteren’s big-picture history. 
They connect people pursuing different interests and they connect ideas with materials. 
 
METAPHOR AND ACTION 
With respect to both forms of mediation, perhaps the most important suggestion I can make 
toward strengthening Van Lunteren’s account (and my own) would be to avoid the term 
“metaphor” for mediating machines. Not that the usage is incorrect; but it fades too easily into 
the perception of mere metaphor, thereby obscuring what I take to be the most important aspect 
of these technologies as mediators, their agency in the world. For example, in the case of the 
steam engine mediating between political economy and natural philosophy, the engine very 
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actively powered the world they shared by producing work. From the political economy side, this 
production of work required analysis in terms of labor value, the measure of the value of 
commodities. From the natural philosophy side, it required analysis in terms of the dynamics of 
heat, and with that, work soon became the defining measure of the “energy” of any system 
whatsoever. Although labor value and energy did not necessarily refer directly to one another, 
they both referred to the all-important, work-producing agency of the engine in the partially 
overlapping domains of political economy and natural philosophy. “Metaphor” seems not 
adequately to capture this active role.  
In the apparently more metaphorical cases of the “difference engine” and the “analytical 
engine,” Charles Babbage expected the machines to generate real products, most simply the 
trigonometrical and logarithmic tables required for innumerable practical uses. Even expressions 
like “engine of deduction” and “engine of development,” which were sometimes employed for 
the differential and integral calculus itself rather than any material machine, referred to the 
power of the calculus to crank out solutions to real-world problems in an efficient manner. In 
that sense the computing engine and the calculus were not merely like engines; they were 
engines. Reflections of this kind (especially when supported by such wide-ranging meanings as 
those contained in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century entries on “engine” in the Oxford 
English Dictionary: microscope, air pump, cotton gin, catapult, the rack, fish trap, grindstone, 
loom, fire engine) suggest that “steam engine” should be thought of as one of many different 
kinds of (nonmetaphorical) engines, albeit one that became an epitome during the industrial 
revolution. “Engine” covered a diverse array of material and nonmaterial contrivances for 
systematic production, whose partially overlapping functions and meanings escape any single 
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definition. But it is precisely this diversity that gives the engine as a mediating machine its 
historiographical (as well as historical) power. 
 
MOSAIC 
Similar remarks apply to the role of balances during the Enlightenment. Their significance 
attached to their action as instruments, as technologies of knowledge, whether material or not. 
They identified natural states of the world as equilibrium states or states of equality: planetary 
orbits (Laplace), chemical reactions (Lavoisier), reason (Condillac and Condorcet), commodity 
markets (Smith), populations (Malthus), justice (Guillotin), and mechanical systems in general 
(Lagrange). But diversity rather than unity characterized this array. The balance was not a single 
concept but a network of interrelated technologies.  
The stress on diversity rather than unity leads me to suggest that the big picture oriented 
around a mediating machine looks less like a general idea or a common skeleton than like a 
mosaic. Even better might be an analogy with Bruegel’s famous depiction of the culture of a 
Netherlandish village in terms of a collection of its familiar proverbs. That is, the big picture 
consists of many smaller stories. It is necessarily superficial and cannot provide the meaning of 
its components, as though they were examples of it, for they in fact constitute it. The components 
retain their own identity and their own stories. This is an in-principle matter. It is only by 
working out details of the smaller stories that we can construct the big picture from their 
interrelations. In this task mediating machines can be of great value, for they help to show how 
interrelations across a broad spectrum actually function. This action is relatively straightforward 
in relating Lavoisier’s chemical balance to his calorimeter as a balance, since both instruments 
actually functioned by weighing. More revealing are seemingly quite distant relations, such as 
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that between the calorimeter and the guillotine, both labeled “la machine” and both conceived as 
balances, with the guillotine enforcing the ideal of class equality in executions. One of the most 
important features of mediating technologies, as in this case, is that they allow us to see in very 
concrete and active terms how social/political aspects of a period interrelate with more strictly 
“scientific” aspects. 
 
COMPLETENESS  
While many people may agree that mediating machines provide useful insights into the basic 
modes of investigating and knowing the world that have been prominent in Western society since 
the seventeenth century, there will probably be less agreement about what particular set of such 
“machines” can adequately cover the ground. In “How the World Works,” with reference 
particularly to the physical sciences in the long nineteenth century, I have suggested that three 
overlapping periods with three main technologies can do much of the work: equilibrium 
dynamics (balances), temporal dynamics (engines), and statistical dynamics (statistical 
technologies). The statistical “machines” are crucial to big-picture history because they provided 
entirely new ways of understanding the world. They grounded statistical and probabilistic 
conceptions of such widely differing things as population, entropy, statistical causality, the 
electron as a statistical object, a species as a population or gene pool, and econometrics as a 
science. For that reason, the corresponding big picture has deserved the title “Probabilistic 
Revolution.”3 
There seem to be few additional moments of reconception and investigation of nature that 
can make a claim on late nineteenth-century science as broad and deep as this one. Evolution and 
the technical means of objectifying it is surely the most obvious candidate. One might also turn 
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to electromagnetic technologies and to chemical synthesis, both of which did much to transform 
the world during the “Second Industrial Revolution.” But this additive approach to completeness 
suggests that big-picture history might well benefit from thinking about mediating machines as 
complexes of technologies (electrical-chemical-statistical-evolutionary) whose interactions are 
critical to the dynamics of science and society. Such an approach would complicate the picture, 
but even for beginning students that may well be a good thing. 
 
COMPUTERS 
An issue of a somewhat different sort arises with respect to the computer as a mediating 
machine, just because there are multiple ways to conceive of its role in the big picture and there 
are various points of entry. Frans van Lunteren has focused on “information,” which is a 
perfectly natural choice for all the reasons he cites. For quite different reasons, I might have 
chosen “complexity.” The new appreciation of complexity that computers have made possible, 
both experimentally and theoretically, has brought with it a skepticism among many scientists 
toward fundamental laws (or models) that supposedly govern the universe (Maxwell’s Equations, 
the Schroedinger Equation, the Standard Model) and are capable of explaining specific events. 
This antireductionist perspective inhabits the biological as well as the physical sciences and is 
apparent in the significance of epigenetics and the microbiome, whereby our very identity, both 
biological and psychological, is integrally bound up with the environment. With complexity have 
come new conceptions of emergence, pattern recognition, and intuition. Concerning “intuition,” 
one need only think of the recent success of AlphaGo in defeating the GO champion Kim Se-dol. 
The machine does not operate by deducing solutions from any general principles of GO but, 
rather, by employing the neural nets of AI to learn what strategies are likely to succeed based on 
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examining millions of games played by masters and by playing against itself. Similar learning 
technologies will soon inhabit self-driving cars and caretaking robots.  
I would like to use this situation to reflect very briefly on the “postmodern condition”—
but less as the loss of grand narratives, to which Van Lunteren alludes in his introduction, than as 
the decline of general laws and principles taken to underlie and to order our knowledge of the 
world. This is the postmodernity that Paul Forman damned in a widely read polemic against the 
practices of historians of technology, which turns on his view that a major cultural shift occurred 
around 1980 from the primacy of science (identified with general laws and disciplinarity) to the 
primacy of technology and to ends justifying means rather than the reverse.4 I would say instead, 
while pushing the transition period back ten years, that with the primacy of the computer in both 
experimental and theoretical work, and serving as the dominant mediating machine in many 
areas of research, science itself has changed. Where unity and simplicity once ruled we now have 
complexity. And where deduction from general laws once constituted the ideal of a properly 
scientific explanation we now also have simulations, data mining, and AI, all dependent on the 
computer. Of course “the computer,” as the mediating machine in all of this, can no more be 
subsumed under a single concept than can the balance or the engine. But the prominence of its 
many roles in both investigating and explaining the world suggests why Van Lunteren’s big-
picture history, organized around mediating machines, may be just what we need in the 
postmodern age. 
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